Il Presidenzialismo turco: un passo in avanti nel consolidamento dell’autoritarismo competitivo o una ulteriore garanzia per la stabilità delle istituzioni?
Abstract
The Turkish Presidentialism: a step forward in the consolidation of competitive authoritarianism or a further guarantee for institutional stability? – Turkey has struggled for a very long time to reform the parliamentary regime introduced at the establishment of the Republic, which political forces periodically blamed as the main responsible for the institutional instability. The presidential form of government introduced in 2017 is characterized by several features aimed at guaranteeing this stability, though at the price of strongly limiting the respect of the principle of the separation of powers and with effects severely impinging on the protection of fundamental rights. The present contribution investigates the content of the reform, focusing on the amendments it has entrenched in the 1982 Constitution and on the consequences they have and/or are going to produce on the relationship among state powers. A section is also devoted to the effects of the reform on
the protection of rights, with specific attention to freedom of expression of political dissent. Concluding remarks highlight the impact of the reform on the endurance of Turkish democracy, framing it in the context of the consolidation of competitive authoritarianism.
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