Fragile Parliamentarism and Resilient Checks and Balances: The Babiš III Government as a Stress Test of the Czech Constitutional Order

Abstract

Abstract: Fragile Parliamentarism and Resilient Checks and Balances: The Babiš III Government as a Stress Test of the Czech Constitutional Order – This article examines the most recent political and electoral developments in the Czech Republic, which culminated in the formation of one of Europe’s most right-leaning governments in January 2026. Against the backdrop of the country’s institutional architecture, the paper assesses whether the existing checks and balances (the President, the Constitutional Court, the Senate, the judiciary, the media, and civil society) can mitigate the risks of an illiberal shift. Drawing comparisons with the constitutional decay that has occurred in Hungary and Poland, the paper argues that, despite its fragility and reliance on negotiation, the Czech system still provides meaningful guardrails in the medium term, particularly given the role of presidential scrutiny, the upper house’s veto power, and judicial review.

Keywords: Czech Republic; 2025 parliamentary elections; Populism; Government; Checks and balances