La Costituzione del Liechtenstein da un punto di vista svizzero: una relazione difficile tra democrazia diretta e monarchia?

Abstract

Difficulty of reconciling direct democracy and monarchy – Liechtenstein's constitutional system combines two elements that at first sight seem rather paradoxical: a high degree of direct democracy, with, in particular, an optional popular referendum (or “brake” referendum), a “proactive” popular initiative and a referendum of parliamentary initiative; and, on the other hand, a monarchy, with a Sovereign – the Prince – who, unlike the heads of state of the other European monarchies, has powers that are not entirely symbolic but, on the contrary, quite strong, or even very strong. The political system is thus characterized by very complex decision-making procedures involving a plurality of actors, which oblige all of them, the Parliament and the Government in particular, to seek consensual solutions likely to meet both the approval of the people in a possible referendum and the sanction of the Prince through his veto power. Despite some real conflicts – quite rare, in fact – between the people or their representatives and the Prince during the first centenary of the Constitution, and despite the criticism of the Constitution, especially since the reform of 2003, Liechtenstein's political system enjoys a certain stability, which is probably also due in part to a high degree of confidence of the population in the institutions and authorities, first and foremost the Princely House.