L’indipendenza della Banca Centrale Europea di fronte a Karlsruhe

Authors

  • Edoardo Sorrentino

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.57660/dpceonline.2021.1422

Keywords:

Central bank independence theory; Ecb’s unconventional monetary policies; Ecb’s accountability; BVerfG 5th may 2020 decision; Ecb’s Schmittian sovereignty.

Abstract

Ecb’s independence in front of Karlsruhe – The essay aims to investigate the constitutional position got by Ecb in the European Union. After showing storical, political and economic reasons that led to Ecb’s birth, the essay will analyse its uncon-ventional decisions, adopted in response to Eurozone structural leaks, which provoked BVerfG’s reaction. It will be clear, then, that BVerfG impossibility to take the political responsibility to cause the end of euro has led to Ecb’s enlargment of functions that requires the necessity to make the central bank responsible of its decision in front of “politics”.

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Published

2021-10-12

How to Cite

Sorrentino, E. (2021). L’indipendenza della Banca Centrale Europea di fronte a Karlsruhe. DPCE Online, 48(3). https://doi.org/10.57660/dpceonline.2021.1422

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