Presidential Policies and the overruling of Chevron Doctrine
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.57660/dpceonline.2024.2346Abstract
The paper analyzes the impact of Chevron’s overruling on the ability of the President to direct the interpretation of congressional delegations for the implementation of his policies. The author verifies the situation existing before Loper Bright, the context of institutional relations, and illustrates the possible effects of the overruling on the ability of the President to implement his political direction through the interpretation of the Statutes provided by agencies.
Keywords: Chevron deference; Loper Bright; Agencies’ interpretation of law; Presidential policies; Judicial review
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