Condizionalità europea e normatività dell’indirizzo politico

European conditionality and normative policy making

Abstract

In the classical conception of the “indirizzo politico normativo”, a typical concept of Italian legal scholarship developed in the late Thirties, constraints for the public authorities derive from non per se juridically binding programmes, that should be transposed into norms. In the multilevel context, with political decision-making dislocated on different planes, the alignment between them may be lost, and new instruments are needed. In the EU, among them, stands out the system of conditionality. It is possible to understand it by the exam of the experiences of implementation of the Next Generation EU. It is much revealing on the fragile nature of the European constitution to observe that conditionality seems to have driven national government forces to commitment to the realisation of the plan only when they can share its inspiring lines (e.g. Italy); on the other hand, if the political context is clearly hostile to a development of European integration, the suspension of funds does not seem to represent a deterrent to conflict with the Euro-unitary guidelines (e.g. Poland and Hungary).