Budget, debt ceiling and “assembly dominance”: Biden’s (and his predecessors’) curbs
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.57660/dpceonline.2023.1790Abstract
Abstract: Bilancio, tetto al debito e “dominanza dell’assemblea”: i limiti di Biden (e dei suoi predecessori) – Biden’s Presidency could have been a good opportunity in several respects, but it has not been, at least so far. As far as the government budget is concerned, a good opportunity could have been the expiry of the Budget Control Act of 2011. That law placed limits on defense discretionary spending and nondefense discretionary spending, enforced by sequestration in effect through FY2021. So, for the fiscal year 2022, the House and Senate have been able to make appropriations freely for the first time in ten years. But the opportunity that could have allowed public spending without austerity constraints soon became an occasion for chaos, disorder, and institutional conflict. And all this brought with it enormous problems with regard to compliance with the public debt ceiling provided by law.
Keywords: Budget Process; Appropriation; Reconciliation Process; Shutdown; Funding Gap.
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