L’indipendenza della Banca Centrale Europea di fronte a Karlsruhe
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.57660/dpceonline.2021.1422Keywords:
Central bank independence theory; Ecb’s unconventional monetary policies; Ecb’s accountability; BVerfG 5th may 2020 decision; Ecb’s Schmittian sovereignty.Abstract
Ecb’s independence in front of Karlsruhe – The essay aims to investigate the constitutional position got by Ecb in the European Union. After showing storical, political and economic reasons that led to Ecb’s birth, the essay will analyse its uncon-ventional decisions, adopted in response to Eurozone structural leaks, which provoked BVerfG’s reaction. It will be clear, then, that BVerfG impossibility to take the political responsibility to cause the end of euro has led to Ecb’s enlargment of functions that requires the necessity to make the central bank responsible of its decision in front of “politics”.
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