Il Presidente contribuente. Neutralità dell’amministrazione fiscale e limiti al potere presidenziale nel caso Trump v. IRS

Abstract

In May 2026, a settlement between President Trump and the Internal Revenue Service included a provision permanently barring tax audits concerning his and his family’s prior tax positions, prompting accusations of an unconstitutional “tax immunity.” This article situates the episode within the broader structural tension inherent in the presidency, which makes him both a taxpayer and the head of the Executive branch overseeing tax administration. Tracing the historical construction of safeguards against political interference in tax enforcement, from Nixon to §7217 of the Internal Revenue Code, this piece examines the settlement’s legality under §7122, Article II, Article III’s adverseness requirement, and the Compensation Clause, before assessing Judge Williams’s July 2026 ruling and offering some comparative insights from Italian constitutional principles on taxation.

Keywords: Presidential Power; Tax Immunity; Tax Administration Neutrality; Separation of Powers; Executive Branch