L’autonomia processuale del giudice costituzionale. Rileggere regole, soggetti e funzioni del processo costituzionale attraverso un crittotipo

The procedural autonomy of the constitutional judge. Reinterpreting rules, actors and functions of the constitutional process through a cryptotype

Abstract

The procedural autonomy of the constitutional judge. Reinterpreting rules, actors and functions of the constitutional process through a cryptotype - For decades, in the vast majority of jurisdictions with constitutional review of legislation, there has been a tendency for constitutional courts to expand and innovate the rules that preside the constitutional process: the forms of access, the nature and the effects of the decisions, the very powers of the constitutional judge are more and more self-regulated by the courts, in the spaces left by general provisions and even against them. The paper examines this trend in different systems, starting with Germany, where the theoretical reflection on the procedural autonomy of the constitutional court was first established. Crossing the German, Italian, Austrian, Spanish, Peruvian, Mexican, and French experiences, the paper comes to define the procedural autonomy as a cryptotype that, even if it wishes to contain its effects, legislatures can hardly eradicate.

Keywords: Constitutional review; Constitutional process; Effects; Decisions; Procedural autonomy.