

Climate migration strategies in the MENA region: a thematic analysis of legal and political frameworks

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Abstract: Strategie di migrazione climatica nella regione MENA: un'analisi tematica della cornice giuridica e politica – Climate migration is increasing across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region as the climate change impacts intersect with political, social, and economic pressures. This paper aims to explore how states in the MENA region engage with climate migration and to analyse four thematic areas related to climate migration strategies: climate adaptation, disaster risk reduction, regional cooperation, and intersectional vulnerability. Using a comparative legal and policy analysis, the paper examines national and regional frameworks, with examples from different countries in this region. The findings show that there is a significant gap in governance related to climate migration, as climate migration is underrepresented in climate policies. Moreover, weak governance and unequal structures undermine the level of protection mechanisms for displaced populations. Finally, the paper offers recommendations to strengthen anticipatory and rights-based responses.

Keywords: Climate migration; MENA region; Adaptation governance; Disaster risk reduction; Regional cooperation

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1. Introduction

Climate-induced migration (hereinafter, climate migration) has become one of the most critical concerns for policymakers due to the effects of climate change on human livelihoods and settlements¹. The scientific assessment indicates that extreme weather events, mainly drought, tropical storms and hurricanes, heavy rains and floods, lead to climate-related displacement and migration within national borders or international movements². The Middle

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¹ A.I. Almulhim, G.N. Alverio, A. Sharifi, R. Shaw, S. Huq, M.J. Mahmud, S. Ahmad, I.R. Abubakar, *Climate-induced migration in the Global South: an in depth analysis*, in 3 (47) *Npj Climate Act.* (2024).

² H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, M. Tignor, A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Lösche, V. Möller, A. Okem (Eds.), *Summary for*

East and North Africa (MENA) is considered one of the most climate-vulnerable regions due to persistent political, economic, and social fragility that intensifies environmental challenges³. The MENA region is warming roughly twice the global average, thereby increasing the risk of displacement from heat stress, drought, reduced crop yields, and coastal erosion. This region is not only under pressure from climate-induced mobilities but is also affected by political, economic, and legal frameworks that shape how states respond to climate change risks⁴.

These structural vulnerabilities increase the scale and intensity of pressures related to mobility and make it challenging for states to protect vulnerable populations or manage movements⁵. At the same time, the lack of international legal recognition of displaced persons by climate change creates gaps in protection frameworks, especially in regions where migration governance frameworks are already fragile and inconsistent⁶. International legal instruments, such as *the Paris Agreement*,⁷ *The Global Compact for Migration*,⁸ and *the Sendai Framework*,⁹ acknowledge climate-related mobility but do not impose binding obligations on states regarding the protection of people displaced by environmental harm¹⁰. As a result, national legal frameworks and political institutions in the MENA region have a critical role in designing, planning, and implementing climate migration strategies.

Climate mobility cannot be understood only through an environmental lens, but should be analysed in connection with political priorities, legal rules, and institutional arrangements that shape how states respond to climate risk¹¹. This issue matters particularly in the MENA region, where diverse political systems, unequal economic capacities, and varying levels of exposure to climate risks lead to significant differences in how governments address climate risks. Some states prioritize technical adaptation policies to reduce mobility risks, while others emphasize migration control, labor governance, or humanitarian assistance, often

Policymakers, Technical Summary and Frequently Asked Questions, in Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 52 (2022).

³ World Bank, *Climate and Development in the Middle East and North Africa*, 2023, www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/brief/climate-and-development-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa.

⁴ K. Waha, L. Krumpal, S. Adams, V. Aich, F. Baarsch, D. Coumou, M. Fader, H. Hoff, G. Jobbins, R. Marcus, M. Mengel, I.M. Otto, M. Perrette, M. Rocha, A. Robinson, C.F. Schleussner, *Climate change impacts in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) region and their implications for vulnerable population groups*, in 17(6) *Reg. Env'l Change* 1623 (2017).

⁵ K. Warner, *Global environmental change and migration: Governance challenges*, in 20(3) *Glob. Env'l Change* 402-413 (2010).

⁶ W. Kälin, *Conceptualising climate-induced displacement*, in J. McAdam (Ed.), *Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*, Oxford, 2010, 81-103.

⁷ Paris Agreement, adopted 12-12-2015.

⁸ Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, adopted 19-12-2018.

⁹ Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, adopted 18-3-2015.

¹⁰ N. Jägers, *Climate change-induced displacement, migration and international law*, in J. Verschuuren (Ed.), *Research Handbook on Climate Change Adaptation Law*, Cheltenham-Northampton, 2022, 68-104.

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

without integrating these policy areas into a coherent strategy¹². Such fragmented approaches highlight the necessity of exploring the effects of legal frameworks and political institutions on climate mobilities across this region.

This paper aims to explore climate migration governance strategies in the MENA region across five thematic areas, each representing a central dimension of the region's institutional responses to climate-induced mobility. The paper considers four thematic areas, including: (i) climate adaptation and migration governance; (ii) disaster risk reduction (DRR) and human mobility; (iii) regional cooperation and cross-border mechanisms; and (iv) vulnerability, inequality, and intersectional impacts. Therefore, this paper aims to assess how legal and political frameworks in the MENA region address climate mobility, highlighting structural gaps that impede effective governance. It concludes with a brief comparative reflection and offers recommendations to strengthen institutional responses to climate mobility in the MENA region.

2. Conceptual Background

2.1 Climate Migration: Legal and Policy Debates

Human mobility in the context of climate change can occur in different forms, such as migration, either voluntary or forced¹³ and over varying distances, from nearby cities to international borders. Moreover, some people choose not to relocate and remain in high-risk areas affected by climate change¹⁴. The diversity of movements highlights the importance of diverse policies to respond to the spectrum of climate migration fully¹⁵. Climate migration is widely affected by the limitations of international refugee law, as the term “climate refugees” has not been recognized under the 1951 Refugee Convention. The convention defines refugee status based on factors such as race, religion, nationality, or political opinion and does not include environmental or climatic reasons¹⁶. Therefore, international bodies, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization of Migration (IOM), discourage the use of “climate refugee” and instead support the more

¹² UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), Report of the Expert Group Meeting to Discuss the 2019 Situation Report on International Migration in the Arab Region, 2019, www.unescwa.org/sites/default/files/archive/u524/meeting-international-migration-arab-region-2019-final-report-en.pdf.

¹³ K. Inke, J. Bergmann, J. Blocher, H. Upadhyay, R. Hoffmann, *Migration as adaptation?*, in 8(4) *Migration Stud.* 626–634 (2020).

¹⁴ K. Vinke, *Climate Migration Governance in the MENA Region: Urgent Action Needed*, in H. Lampalzer, G. Hainzl (Eds.), *Climate.Changes.Security. Navigating Climate Change and Security Challenges in the OSCE Region*, Vienna, 2024, 113–127.

¹⁵ Moreover, on a temporal scale, climate migration is an environmental influence movement in response to long-term environmental degradation or suddenly as a result of extreme weather events, *Ibid.*

¹⁶ 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1A(2).

accurate term “climate migration,” which describes movement without implying an absence of a legal protection framework¹⁷.

Climate migration is perceived as a "multi-causal process," as environmental degradation connects with political, economic, and population factors shaping migration decisions¹⁸. These interconnections elaborate why climate migration requires a conceptual approach that recognizes both environmental drivers and the structural vulnerabilities that shape people’s ability to move. In addition, it is essential to address the question of who is most affected by climate pressures. For instance, people living in climate-sensitive rural areas, informal settlements, or environmentally fragile regions are more likely to experience climate migration. Social inequalities, including gender, class, age, disability, citizenship status, and access to land, further determine who can migrate, who is displaced involuntarily, and who remains in high climate risk areas¹⁹. These differentiated experiences highlight why climate migration must be analysed within broader governance structures, rather than as a purely environmental problem.

2.2 International Legal and Political Frameworks Relevant to Climate Migration

International law has not yet established a specific protection system for people moving due to climate change, which transforms climate migration into one of the most complicated legal areas of global governance²⁰. The 1951 Refugee Convention²¹ remains the core instrument for international protection, which does not extend refugee status to displaced individuals affected by climate factors unless environmental factors intersect with targeted persecution; such a situation arises only in exceptional cases. This legal gap has prompted ongoing debate over whether international law should explicitly define climate migration. However, some states yet argue the need for new legally binding obligations in this matter.²²

In the absence of a specific treaty, few existing international frameworks address climate migration indirectly through soft law instruments. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) first acknowledged human mobility in the context of climate change in the “Cancun Adaptation Framework”, which invites states to enhance understanding and cooperation on climate-induced displacement, migration, and planned relocation²³. The Paris Agreement further

¹⁷ E. Ferris & J. Bergmann, *Soft law, migration and climate change governance*, in 8(1) *J. Hum. Rts. & Env't* 6–29 (2017).

¹⁸ T. Affi, R. Govil, P. Sakdapolrak, K. Warner, *Climate change, vulnerability and human mobility: Perspectives of refugees from the East and Horn of Africa*, in UNHCR, 2012, www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/4fe8538d9.pdf.

¹⁹ P. Lama, M. Hamza, M. Wester, *Gendered dimensions of migration in relation to climate change*, in 13(4) *Clim. & Dev.* 326–336 (2021).

²⁰ Ferris & Bergmann, *supra*, n. 14.

²¹ Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137.

²² H. Alexander, J. Simon, *"Unable to Return" in the 1951 Refugee Convention: Stateless refugees and climate change*, in 26(3) *Florida J. Int'l L.* (2014).

²³ UNFCCC, Cancun Adaptation Framework, Decision 1/CP.16 (2010), para. 14(f).

recognised the issue by establishing the “Task Force on Displacement”, mandated to develop recommendations on how states could minimise and address displacement related to climate impacts²⁴. Although these provisions do not create binding legal responsibilities, the instruments represent the most formal acknowledgement within the UNFCCC regime of the link between climate change and human mobility.

In the area of global governance, *the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM)* includes one of the most comprehensive international policy statements on climate migration, recognising environmental degradation, climate change, disasters, and slow-onset processes as drivers of human mobility. The GCM encourages states to integrate climate considerations in governing migration, expand legal pathways for migration, and strengthen data collection about environmental mobilities, although it acknowledges that all of these commitments are voluntary²⁵. Although it is a non-binding instrument, the GCM has become an influential reference point for states seeking guidance on policy development in the absence of binding norms.

Another important framework is *the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030)*, which calls on states to reduce disaster displacement by investing in early-warning systems, risk assessments, and disaster preparedness²⁶. Because many climate-related mobilities result from extreme weather events such as floods and storms, the Sendai Framework provides an indirect governance structure for climate migration through its focus on disaster risk reduction and resilience. Similar to the GCM, the Sendai Framework imposes no legal obligations on states to protect displaced people or to accept them as a result of climate change impacts, and it leaves considerable discretion to national authorities²⁷.

In addition, human rights law provides potential safeguards, though its effectiveness largely depends on implementation and the judiciary's will at the national level. *The UN Human Rights Committee's decision in Teitiota v. New Zealand* confirmed that returning people to places where their lives are at risk from climate change impacts may violate the right to life under the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*²⁸, even though this does not establish an independent right to migrate for climate reasons²⁹. This decision demonstrates that human rights norms can play a significant role in addressing climate migration, although their scope of protection remains limited and depends on the specific circumstances of each case.

At the political level, states disagree on responsibility-sharing and the appropriate mechanisms for addressing climate migration. Some developing

²⁴ UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, Decision 1/CP.21 (2015), para. 49.

²⁵ Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, A/RES/73/195 (2018), Objective 2.

²⁶ Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, UN Doc. A/RES/69/283 (2015).

²⁷ L. Guadagno, *Human Mobility in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction*, in 7(1) *Int'l J. Disaster Risk Sci.* 30–40 (2016).

²⁸ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171.

²⁹ Human Rights Committee, *Teitiota v. New Zealand*, CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 (2020).

countries argue that states with higher historical Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions have greater responsibilities to protect climate-displaced people by creating migration pathways³⁰. On the other hand, developed countries have avoided accepting obligations that implicitly expand their commitments to accept more migrants, preferring to focus on adaptation and resilience responses³¹. These fragmented legal commitments have significant implications for the MENA region, where climate risks are intensifying. National governance systems, thus, must address the absence of internationally binding standards for responding to climate migration.

2.3 Climate Vulnerability and Migration Patterns in the MENA Region

The MENA region is among the world's most climate-vulnerable areas, where it experiences extreme heat, severe water scarcity, droughts, and increasing desertification that directly impact human mobility³². Climate change intensifies pre-existing environmental challenges, such as declining groundwater resources, land degradation, and coastal erosion, thereby undermining rural livelihoods and increasing mobility to urban areas. Such environmental pressures have a significant role in climate migration by reducing economic opportunities in rural areas and increasing the risk of both temporary and permanent displacement³³.

Water scarcity is one of the main drivers of climate migration in this region³⁴. Declining agricultural productivity, coupled with rising temperatures, limits agricultural productivity and increases reliance on costly irrigation, thereby causing many households to migrate when farming becomes unsustainable. In several countries, including Iraq, Yemen, and Jordan, climate-related water shortages have already contributed to rural migration and displacement from climate-stressed areas³⁵.

³⁰ G. Arce, Á. García-Alaminos, M., Ortiz, J., Zafrilla, *Attributing climate-change-related disaster displacement responsibilities along global production chains*, in 27(11) *iScience* 111124 (2024).

³¹ F. Gemenne, J. Blocher, *How can migration serve adaptation to climate change? Challenges to fleshing out a policy ideal*, in 183(4) *Geo. J.* 336–347 (2017).

³² World Bank, *Turn Down the Heat: Confronting the New Climate Normal*, Washington D.C., 2014; Several MENA countries are warming at roughly twice the global average, exposing populations to increasing heat stress and making many areas less suitable for agriculture and human habitation.

³³ G. Cissé, R. McLeman, H. Adams, P. Aldunce, K. Bowen, D. Campbell-Lendrum, S. Clayton, K.L. Ebi, J. Hess, C. Huang, Q. Liu, G. McGregor, J. Semenza, M.C. Tirado, *Health, Wellbeing, and the Changing Structure of Communities*, in H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Löschke, V. Möller, A. Okem, B. Rama (Eds.), *Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability*, Cambridge, 2022, 1041–1170,

³⁴ The MENA region has only about one percent of the world's freshwater resources, which supports over five percent of its population, creating acute vulnerability to climate-induced water stress.

³⁵ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), *Climate change, migration and rural adaptation in the Near East and North Africa region*, Rome, 2018, openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/45b76014-d564-4072-9e26-baa843ecee3e/content.

Urban areas also face increasing pressures from climate migration. Large cities such as Cairo and Baghdad are accepting an increasing number of climate-affected rural migrants, which intensifies the challenges related to housing, employment, and access to basic services³⁶. Migrants are often settled in informal habitats where they suffer from a lack of infrastructure and are vulnerable to climate change impacts. Such patterns show how climate migration creates secondary risks for displaced populations, intensifying social and economic inequalities in urban areas.³⁷

Conflict dynamics also make the connection between climate vulnerability and migration more complicated in some parts of the region³⁸. In countries such as Syria, Yemen, Sudan, and Libya, climate stress interacts with conflict, weak governance, and economic instability, making it difficult to distinguish climate mobilities from broader displacement patterns. For instance, prolonged droughts in Syria and agricultural disruptions preceding the onset of the internal war have led to rural migration, illustrating how climate factors intensify existing tensions and drive displacement. In fragile states, limited institutional capacity often prevents governments from responding effectively to climate impacts, which increases the scale and possibility of climate migration³⁹.

Climate vulnerability in the MENA region shapes diverse and complex mobility patterns, including rural-urban migration and displacement from degraded environments, which can lead to conflict and economic instability. These dynamic and interconnected issues underscore the need for inclusive legal and policy frameworks that recognize and respond to climate impacts on migration.

2.4 Why a Thematic Approach Is Necessary for the MENA Region

The MENA region has diverse economic capacities and legal frameworks, which have implications for addressing climate migration across the region. These differences influence the state's understanding of climate change, the allocation of responsibilities among institutions, and the prioritisation of responses across adaptation, disaster management, and migration governance. In this regard, analysing climate migration through a unified regional pattern may overlook important differences in exposure, vulnerability, and policy capacity across countries. A thematic approach helps analyse and identify regional patterns and recognize national differences.

³⁶ UN-Habitat, *The State of Arab Cities Report 2020 (Executive Summary)*, 2020, www.unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/2020/06/sacr_2020_executive_summary_en.pdf.

³⁷ International Organization for Migration (IOM), *Compendium: Migration, environment and climate change — Policy Briefs and Research*, 2018, www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/2018-07/compendium_climate_change_0.pdf.

³⁸ G. Abel, M. Brottrager, J.C. Crespo Cuaresma & R. Muttarak, *Climate, conflict and forced migration*, in *54 Glob. Env'l Change Hum. Pol'y Dim.* 239–249 (2019).

³⁹ Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore, *Climate-Induced Security Challenges: Insights from the Middle East*, 29-4-2025, mei.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Climate-induced-Security-Challenges.pdf.

This method shows how different policy-making areas, such as adaptation planning, disaster risk reduction, regional cooperation, climate finance, and inequality, shape the regional capacity to respond to climate migration. The following sections examine these thematic areas in detail to assess how legal and political frameworks in the MENA region shape state responses to climate migration.

3. Thematic Areas in Climate Migration Governance in the MENA Region

3.1 Climate Adaptation and Climate Migration Governance

Climate adaptation has become one of the crucial components of the ways used by states to address climate change impacts, which increasingly affects climate migration governance in the MENA region⁴⁰. Most MENA countries have developed national climate strategies and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement⁴¹, but references to migration remain limited or absent in many of these instruments.⁴² Climate adaptation policy often focuses on sectors such as water management, agriculture, and urban planning, even though these areas are directly connected to climate pressures that drive migration⁴³. In countries such as Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, where water scarcity is severe, national adaptation plans acknowledge the impacts of drought and land degradation⁴⁴ but rarely prioritise climate migration as a policy issue.

This gap reflects a broader reluctance among governments to recognize migration as an adaptation strategy⁴⁵, because migration in such

⁴⁰ K. Vinke, *op. cit.*, 115.

⁴¹ S. Osman, *Assessing Climate Adaptation Plans in the Middle East and North Africa*, in *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 15 April 2024, carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/research/2024/04/assessing-climate-adaptation-plans-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa. According to the NDC registry published at the UNFCCC website, all MENA region countries, with the exceptions of Libya, Yemen, and Iran (which have not ratified the Agreement as of early 2026 and therefore do not appear with NDCs) have submitted their NDCs.

⁴² D. Mombauer, A.-C. Link, K. van der Geest, *Addressing climate-related human mobility through NDCs and NAPs: State of play, good practices, and the ways forward*, in *Frontiers in Climate (Climate Mobility)*, 14 March 2023, www.frontiersin.org/journals/climate/articles/10.3389/fclim.2023.1125936/full; This study conducts a global analysis of NDCs and does not provide a MENA-specific assessment. However, its findings on generally limited and often non-operational integration of human mobility provide useful context for understanding similar gaps in MENA countries.

⁴³ H. Upadhyay, I. Kelman, L.G. Jayaprakash, C. Shreve, R. Stojanov, *Conceptualizing and contextualizing research and policy for links between climate change and migration*, in 7(3) *Int'l J. Clim. Change Strat. Mgmt.* 394-417 (2015).

⁴⁴ L. Szaboova, *Climate change, migration and rural adaptation in the Near East and North Africa region*, Roma, FAO, 2023.

⁴⁵ According to the UNFCCC's NAP Central registry, 7 of the 19 countries in the MENA region (Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, and the State of Palestine) have officially submitted NAPs. This indicates that only a limited number of countries in the region have formalised adaptation planning through the NAP process,

countries, which are already facing demographic pressures and regional instability, is a sensitive political issue. For example, Palestine's NAP refers to displacement primarily as a climate-related risk, particularly in relation to social disruption and psychological impacts, rather than framing mobility as a potential adaptation strategy⁴⁶. States are encouraged under the UNFCCC to integrate human mobility considerations into their climate National Adaptation Plan (NAP), but formulating such guidance for national policies in the MENA region has been a slow and inconsistent process⁴⁷. Some countries with international support have started to assess the linkages between adaptation and mobility; however, the institutional capacity remains limited, and responsibilities have not been clearly defined among institutions⁴⁸. For instance, Morocco's NAP recognise rural vulnerability to climate impacts, particularly in terms of agriculture, water, and rural livelihoods, but has not included mechanisms to address population movements resulting from these pressures⁴⁹.

Jordan's NAP reveals a structural gap between climate adaptation planning and migration governance. Although climate migration is a serious problem in Jordan, driven primarily by water scarcity, land degradation, and urbanisation, which prompt people, particularly young people, to move to urban areas⁵⁰, its NAP in section 2.3.2. "water sector", treats water scarcity merely as an essential risk. The plan remains largely programmatic without providing binding mechanisms to manage internal migration flows⁵¹. In North African countries such as Egypt, adaptation planning has focused on coastal protection and water infrastructure, and internal climate-related migration is addressed only through general development or social protection policies⁵².

Urban planning is another area where adaptation policies intersect with climate migration because rural migrants move to urban areas in

which may partly explain why references to human mobility within these instruments remain limited.

⁴⁶ SLYCAN Trust, *Briefing Note. Human Mobility in National Adaptation Plans* (Updated Version), Colombo, 2024, disasterdisplacement.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/UPDATED-Briefing-Note-Human-Mobility-in-NAPs-1_compressed.pdf.

⁴⁷ UNFCCC, Cancun Adaptation Framework, Decision 1/CP.16 (2010), para. 14(f); Q. Wodon, N. Burger, A. Grant, A. Liverani, *Climate Change, Migration, and Adaptation in the MENA Region*, MPRA Paper 56927, University Library of Munich, Germany (2014).

⁴⁸ F. Gemenne, J. Blocher, *How can migration serve adaptation to climate change? Challenges to fleshing out a policy ideal*, in 183(4) *Geo. J.* 336–347 (2017).

⁴⁹ *Morocco National Adaptation Plan 2022–2030*, 2024, unfccc.int/documents/636730.

⁵⁰ International Organization for Migration (IOM), *Empowering Jordanian youth to face climate change and its impacts on human mobility*, in *Environmental Migration Portal* – IOM, 2024, environmentalmigration.iom.int/blogs/empowering-jordanian-youth-face-climate-change-and-its-impacts-human-mobility.

⁵¹ Ministry of Environment (Jordan), *National Climate Change Adaptation Plan of Jordan*, 2021, Amman, 24–25, www.moenv.gov.jo/ebv4.0/root_storage/ar/eb_list_page/final_draft_nap-2021.pdf.

⁵² Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA), *Egypt National Climate Change Strategy (NCCS) 2050 (2022), Objective (2.d): Resilient infrastructure and services in the face of climate change impacts*, 22 www.eeaa.gov.eg/Uploads/Topics/Files/20221206130720583.pdf.

response to environmental degradation⁵³. However, urban adaptation measures in the MENA region rarely consider the needs of climate-induced migrants.⁵⁴ Institutional fragmentation affects how adaptation governance addresses climate migration⁵⁵. In many MENA countries, climate policy responsibilities are distributed among ministries of the environment, water, agriculture, interior, and planning, creating coordination challenges⁵⁶. Since mobility issues are often addressed by security ministries or institutions separately, these problems are rarely integrated into the climate adaptation process, leading to parallel, fragmented systems that operate without meaningful interaction⁵⁷.

Despite these challenges, there is growing recognition among regional and international actors that adaptation policies must engage more directly with climate migration⁵⁸. International organisations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), IOM, and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) have supported projects in countries including Tunisia and Lebanon to explore how adaptation initiatives can reduce climate-related displacement by strengthening livelihoods and community resilience⁵⁹. These efforts remain limited but indicate an emerging effort toward integrating mobility concerns into climate adaptation strategies.

3.2 Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Climate Migration

Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) frameworks are increasingly important in shaping MENA states' responses to climate migration, as many migration events in the region occur in the context of sudden-onset hazards such as floods, storms, and wildfires⁶⁰. The Sendai Framework provides the primary

⁵³ C. Wenger, D. Abulfotuh, *Rural Migration in the Near East and North Africa – Regional Trends*, Cairo, FAO, 2019, openknowledge.fao.org/handle/20.500.14283/CA3872EN.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁵ L.M. Dellmuth, M.-T. Gustafsson, E. Kural, *Global adaptation governance: Explaining the governance responses of international organizations to new issue linkages*, in 114 *Env'l Sci. & Pol'y* 204-215 (2020).

⁵⁶ For example, climate governance in Jordan is centralised in the Ministry of Environment. However, implementation of some policies is distributed among different line ministries—often without binding inter-ministerial enforcement mechanisms.

⁵⁷ UNDP, *Climate Change Adaptation in the Arab States: Best practices and lessons learned, 2019*; UN ESCWA, Expert Group Meeting to Discuss the 2019 Situation Report on International Migration in the Arab Region, UN House, Beirut, 15-4-2019, www.unescwa.org/sites/default/files/archive/u524/meeting-international-migration-arab-region-2019-final-report-en.pdf.

⁵⁸ K. Vinke, J. Bergmann, J. Blocher, H. Upadhyay, R. Hoffmann, *Migration as Adaptation?*, in 8(4) *Migration Stud.* 626–634 (2020).

⁵⁹ UNDP, *The future of development in the MENA region rests on climate security*, 28-8-2023, climatepromise.undp.org/news-and-stories/future-development-mena-region-rests-climate-security; UNDP, *Investing in local solutions to build climate resilience from the ground up in Africa*, 18-7-2025, www.undp.org/romecentre/blog/investing-local-solutions-build-climate-resilience-ground-africa.

⁶⁰ United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), *Regional Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction in the Arab Region 2021* (Updated 2022), 2022, www.undrr.org/sites/default/files/2022-08/RAR%20on%20disaster%20risk%20reduction%20in%20the%20Arab%20region%20

global reference for DRR and explicitly calls on states to reduce displacement by investing in preparedness, early warning systems, and risk-informed development planning⁶¹. Although this framework is not a binding instrument, it influences national legislation and policymaking across the region, encouraging states to consider migration as a key component of disaster governance.

Several MENA countries developed DRR national strategies based on the Sendai framework, but integration of climate migration remained limited in these strategies⁶². In Morocco, national DRR regulations emphasize risk prevention and local resilience, but do not include specific provisions on managing displacement or supporting people who move due to climate change impacts⁶³. Tunisia has developed a national DRR strategy, which identifies floods and droughts as the main disasters, but addresses climate migration only indirectly through emergency response planning⁶⁴. In Egypt, DRR policies highlight risks affecting the Nile Delta and coastal areas, but human mobility given sea-level rise or severe storms is addressed primarily through development planning and not targeted mobility frameworks⁶⁵.

In conflict-affected countries like Yemen⁶⁶, Syria, and Sudan, weak governance structures, vulnerable infrastructures, and ongoing instability undermine the capacity of institutions to reduce displacement caused by climate change in the DRR area⁶⁷. Political instability in such countries often impedes coordinated DRR planning and leaves climate-vulnerable

02021-Updated%202022-EN.pdf; for more information, see www.undrr.org/RAR24AR.

⁶¹ United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), *What is the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction?*, 2025, www.undrr.org/implementing-sendai-framework/what-sendai-framework.

⁶² Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), ESCWA Water Development Report 7: *Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction in the Arab Region*, Beirut, 2017, www.unescwa.org/sites/default/files/event/materials/escwa-water-development-report-7-english.pdf.

⁶³ Government of Morocco, *Stratégie Nationale de Gestion des Risques des Catastrophes Naturelles 2020-2030*, 2020, www.preventionweb.net/publication/morocco-strategie-nationale-de-gestion-des-risques-des-catastrophes-naturelles-2020.

⁶⁴ Government of Tunisia, *Stratégie nationale de réduction des risques de catastrophe à l'horizon 2030 et plan d'action 2021*, 2021, www.preventionweb.net/publication/tunisia-strategie-nationale-de-reduction-des-risques-de-catastrophe-lhorizon-2030-et.

⁶⁵ *Egypt's National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 2030* (2011), *Chapter VIII: Regional and International Cooperation and Ongoing Initiatives to Adapt to Climate Change in the Arab Republic of Egypt*, climate-laws.org/document/egypt-s-national-strategy-for-disaster-risk-reduction_d6b9.

⁶⁶ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Yemen, www.unocha.org/yemen.

⁶⁷ See A. Opdyke, S. Banki, *A review of the climate change-disaster-conflict nexus and humanitarian framing of complex displacement contexts*, in *Clim. & Dev.* (2025), doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2025.2514027; UNDP & DPPA, *Trends and Impacts in Conflict Settings No. 7: Climate, peace and security in the Arab region*, 2023, www.undp.org/arab-states/publications/trends-and-impacts-conflict-settings-no-7-climate-peace-and-security-arab-region.

populations dependent on humanitarian actors for temporary relief rather than long-term protection policies.

As in the previous thematic area, fragmented authorities responsible for climate governance and disaster management create parallel frameworks, lacking official, consistent mechanisms that complicate climate migration. In addition, rapid and unplanned urbanisation in cities such as Cairo and Baghdad places a growing number of low-income migrants in informal settlements that are vulnerable to flooding and extreme heat.⁶⁸ DRR strategies in these cities primarily focus on infrastructure and emergency responses, and rarely consider the specific vulnerabilities of climate migrants and their violated human rights⁶⁹.

Despite these challenges, some positive developments have emerged in recent years. In countries like Lebanon and Jordan, efforts have begun to incorporate migration considerations into national disaster response plans, due to their experiences in receiving large displaced populations and addressing climate risk management⁷⁰. Regional organisations, including the Arab Organization for Civil Protection and Civil Defence and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for West Asia (UNESCWA), have promoted capacity-building initiatives that encourage states to incorporate mobility into disaster preparedness⁷¹. Such initiatives demonstrate increased awareness of the importance of integrating climate migration into DRR policies, even though these policies remain incomplete.

3.3 Regional Cooperation and Cross-Border Governance Mechanisms

The regional cooperation related to climate migration in the MENA region is still limited, as most of the countries have not established joint legal frameworks or formal cross-border mechanisms to manage climate-induced mobilities⁷². Unlike other regions, such as the Pacific or parts of Africa,

⁶⁸ UN-Habitat, *The State of Arab Cities Report 2020 (Executive Summary)*, 2020, www.unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/2020/06/sacr_2020_executive_summary_en.pdf.

⁶⁹ International Organization for Migration (IOM), *Migrants in Disaster Risk Reduction: Practices for Inclusion*, 2017, publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migrants_in_drr.pdf.

⁷⁰ UNDRR, UN agencies launch joint programme to support Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon in climate change response, 4 April 2024, www.undrr.org/news/un-agencies-launch-joint-programme-support-iraq-jordan-and-lebanon-climate-change-response; M. Gulati, N. Zaarour, N. Farajalla, *Jordan Humanitarian, Inclusion and Protection portfolio review (2024)*, [www.clean-helpdesk.org/api/storage/file?path=newFolder/pdfs/CLEAN_Helpdesk_JordanHIP_ICF\[352597\]-e7bddaeb_a729_4d5e_90c7_9b023c39a5d1.pdf](http://www.clean-helpdesk.org/api/storage/file?path=newFolder/pdfs/CLEAN_Helpdesk_JordanHIP_ICF[352597]-e7bddaeb_a729_4d5e_90c7_9b023c39a5d1.pdf).

⁷¹ Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), *ESCWA Water Development Report 7: Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction in the Arab Region*, Beirut, 2017, www.unescwa.org/sites/default/files/event/materials/escwa-water-development-report-7-english.pdf.

⁷² World Bank, *Climate change and migration: Evidence from the Middle East and North Africa*, 2018, documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/748271468278938347/pdf/Climate-change-and-migration-evidence-from-the-Middle-East-and-North-Africa.pdf.

MENA lacks a regional agreement addressing climate migration, and migration remains politically sensitive due to security concerns and ongoing conflicts⁷³.

The regional organizations, such as the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), have addressed climate change and migration separately, without creating binding commitments on climate migration⁷⁴. The Arab League has ratified regional climate strategies and frameworks on disaster management, but these instruments contain no provisions addressing the transboundary mobilities associated with climate change. Although this region is affected by water scarcity, drought, and rising temperatures, this organization has not established cooperative mechanisms or legal frameworks to address climate migration.⁷⁵

The GCC presents a different dynamic, as climate change impacts, particularly extreme heat, affect a large migrant workforce, but migration governance remains controlled by national labour and residency laws⁷⁶. Although the GCC countries are cooperating in economic and security areas, no joint mechanism exists for addressing climate change that affects millions of migrant workers, as they are working in open areas without legal protection. The absence of a common policy is notable given the increasing frequency of heatwaves and the reliance of these economies on migrant labour from across Asia and parts of the MENA region⁷⁷.

Transboundary environmental challenges highlight the need for regional cooperation; for example, Iraq, Syria, and Iran are facing sand and dust storms due to land degradation, but political tensions prevent sustainable cooperation for environmental management and supporting climate migrants⁷⁸. Additionally, declining flows in shared river basins like the Tigris-Euphrates and the Jordan River worsen water scarcity, but existing agreements mainly focus on water allocation rather than migration governance⁷⁹. These examples clearly show that the lack of regional cooperation on environmental issues directly affects the ability to manage climate migration.

⁷³ K. Vinke, *op. cit.*, 119.

⁷⁴ G. Tsourapas, *Migration Diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa: Power, Mobility, and the State*, Manchester, 2021.

⁷⁵ United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), *Arab States Disaster Risk Reduction Report — Towards a Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction*, 2021, www.preventionweb.net/files/59464_asdrrreportinsidefinalforweb.pdf.

⁷⁶ Z. Babar, *Migrant labor and human rights in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries*, in M. Monshipouri (Ed.) *Why Human Rights Still Matter in Contemporary Global Affairs*, London, 2020.

⁷⁷ Gulf Health Council, *Gulf Health Annual Report 2024*, 2025, www.ghc.sa/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Gulf-Health-Annual-Report-2024-1.pdf.

⁷⁸ United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), World Meteorological Organization (WMO) & United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), *Global Assessment of Sand and Dust Storms*, 2016, wesh.unep.org/media/docs/assessments/global_assessment_of_sand_and_dust_storms.pdf.

⁷⁹ X. Wang, B. Cui, Y. Chen, T. Feng, Z. Li, G. Fang, *Dynamic processes of water conflicts and their coupling with water crises in Asia's transboundary river basins*, in 172 *Eco. Indicators* 113325 (2025), doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2025.113325.

Although the UfM has promoted climate adaptation, renewable energy, and resilience-building projects, it has not developed a legal or policy framework linking climate impacts to migration flows between North Africa and Southern Europe. The UfM initiatives in climate security recognize human mobility as a potential challenge; however, it invests more in technical and environmental projects⁸⁰.

Despite these challenges, some emerging initiatives show the recognition of the significance of regional cooperation. UNESCWA, for instance, has urged countries to incorporate climate migration into their regional climate agendas and has affirmed the importance of early warning systems and shared data collection⁸¹. Furthermore, *the Arab Ministerial Water Council* has also discussed transboundary water challenges, which indirectly relate to climate migration by addressing one of the region's main environmental drivers of displacement.⁸² Although these efforts are largely advisory, they signal a gradual shift towards regional dialogue on the intersection of climate change and migration.

3.4 Vulnerability, Inequality, and Intersectional Impacts of Climate Migration

Climate migration in the MENA region is shaped by considerable inequalities that determine who is most vulnerable to climate risks and who has the capacity to migrate and adapt. Environmental pressures, such as water scarcity, increasing temperature, and land degradation, disproportionately affect rural communities and low-income households⁸³. As climate change impacts combine with social and economic challenges in this region, such communities often are forced to migrate under more risky conditions, making them more vulnerable to exploitation, informal employment, and unsafe housing in destination areas.

Gender is a key factor of vulnerability in climate migration. Women are more exposed to risks during displacement caused by climate change in rural areas because they have limited access to land, financial resources, and decision-making power, which restricts their ability for independent migration or participation in adaptation strategies⁸⁴. In North African countries such as Morocco and Tunisia, women's dependence on agriculture and unpaid labor puts them at greater risk of climate change impacts⁸⁵. At the same time, restrictive social norms limit their mobility options. In fragile

⁸⁰ European Parliament, *The Pact for the Mediterranean: Co-creating a space of peace, prosperity and stability through a genuine partnership*, 2025.

⁸¹ ESCWA, *Arab Centre for Climate Change Policies (ACCCP)*, www.unescwa.org/acccp.

⁸² Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), *Arab Ministerial Water Council*, archive.unescwa.org/arab-ministerial-water-council.

⁸³ International Organization for Migration (IOM), *Regional factsheets — Middle East and North Africa*, Chapter 3, 2023, mena.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1686/files/documents/2023-12/regional_factsheets_mena-ch-3.pdf.

⁸⁴ H. Boetto, J. McKinnon, *Rural women and climate change: A gender-inclusive perspective*, in 66(2) *Australian Soc. Work* 234–247 (2013).

⁸⁵ Z. Moneer, *Women and climate change in MENA: Turning adversity into opportunity*, in *Middle East Institute*, 6 February 2024, www.mei.edu/publications/women-and-climate-change-mena-turning-adversity-opportunity.

and conflict-affected contexts like Yemen, displacement due to floods or droughts increases gender-based violence and limits access to basic health care and education⁸⁶.

Children, older people, persons with disabilities, and stateless populations also face greater risks during climate migration⁸⁷. For example, older people affected by drought in southern Iraq often remain in vulnerable conditions because they lack the physical ability or economic resources for mobility⁸⁸. In addition, people with disabilities are disproportionately affected during floods and heatwaves in informal settlements across Egypt and Lebanon, where evacuation and protection measures are inadequate⁸⁹. Migrant workers and refugees are also among the most vulnerable communities in the region. Millions of migrant workers in the Persian Gulf countries, in sectors such as construction and agriculture, are exposed to extreme heat that is intensifying due to climate change.⁹⁰

In Cairo and Baghdad, for instance, new climate migrants typically lack secure tenure and live in areas exposed to floods, pollution, and heatwaves, which intensify environmental and socio-economic vulnerability⁹¹. Because urban policies in many MENA countries do not explicitly address climate migration, these populations are not receiving significant attention in most adaptation and protection frameworks⁹². In many of the MENA countries, environmental governance, disaster management, and laws and policies related to migration operate separately without coordination, leading to a lack of protection mechanisms for climate-vulnerable communities⁹³. Legal frameworks do not recognise climate migration and therefore do not provide targeted safeguards for vulnerable populations, such as access to social protection, labour rights, or support mechanisms to manage movements. As a result, those most affected by climate impacts must rely on informal networks, humanitarian assistance, or temporary coping strategies that do not address structural vulnerabilities.

⁸⁶ Humanitarian Programme Cycle, *Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview*, 2023, 71, fscluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/yemen_humanitarian_needs_overview_h_no_2023_0.pdf.

⁸⁷ L.S. Nishimura, *Gaps in Protection: Climate Change, Human Mobility, and Current Approaches*, in Id., *Climate Change, Human Rights, and Adaptive Mobility*, Oxford, 2025, 19.

⁸⁸ Norwegian Refugee Council, *A Dry Horizon: Iraq's interlinked drought and climate crises*, 2022, www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/a-dry-horizon-2022.pdf.

⁸⁹ Humanity & Inclusion (HI), *How climate change affects people with disabilities*, 28-11-2023, www.hi.org/en/news/how-climate-change-affects-people-with-disabilities

⁹⁰ A. Naderi Beni, N. Marriner, A. Sharifi, J. Azizpour, K. Kabiri, M. Djamali, A. Kirman, *Climate change: A driver of future conflicts in the Persian Gulf Region?*, in 7(12) *Heliyon* e08655 1-18 (2021).

⁹¹ International Organization for Migration (IOM), *Urban Migration Trends in the Middle East and North Africa Region and the Challenge of Conflict-induced Displacement*, WMR 2015 Background Paper by M. Serageldin, F. Vigier, M. Larsen, 2014 (IOM, Geneva).

⁹² ESCWA, *Migration and Climate Change in the Arab Region*, Beirut, 2024, www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2024-07/migration_and_climate_change_in_the_arab_region-policy_brief-eng_0.pdf.

⁹³ *Ibidem*.

4. Climate Migration Strategies Thematic Areas Comparative Analysis

A comparative analysis of the four thematic areas discussed in the previous section demonstrates that legal and policy frameworks related to climate migration are fragmented and inconsistent, with some regions experiencing emerging initiatives while others still lack coherent governance approaches. Climate adaptation and DRR frameworks received the most attention in the MENA region in developing initiatives. However, climate risk awareness has rarely led to targeted actions to address climate migration in adaptation and DRR strategies. Regional cooperation mechanisms remain the weakest area, as MENA states have not established a shared approach to climate migration despite facing everyday environmental pressures and cross-border risks.

Intersectional vulnerabilities are also a challenge across all thematic areas, highlighting existing gaps in protection systems and unequal structures that intensify climate migration. In the thematic areas of climate adaptation, some countries have developed NAPs; However, these instruments have not incorporated migration as a manageable consequence of climate change⁹⁴.

Adaptation plans in Morocco⁹⁵, and Jordan⁹⁶ acknowledge environmental pressures, particularly drought, water scarcity, and agricultural decline, but fail to identify institutional responsibilities or policy mechanisms to manage population movements. Climate migration thus remains politically sensitive, cross-sectoral, and institutionally fragmented.

However, an opportunity exists because adaptation plans already provide an institutional entry point for addressing climate migration through livelihood support, rural resilience programs, and migration planning. Strengthening this connection would enable states to view migration as part of adaptation rather than a policy failure.

In the field of disaster risk reduction, countries, including MENA states, have made more observable progress, mainly due to the Sendai Framework and international support⁹⁷. Countries such as Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt have adopted DRR strategies or updated disaster management laws, and these instruments acknowledge climate risks, including floods, storms, and droughts. However, these strategies still treat displacement primarily as an emergency response rather than as a predictable outcome that requires long-term planning, sustainable frameworks, and social protection measures for displaced populations. Conflict-affected countries, including Yemen, Syria, and Sudan, face even greater risks, given that weak state capacity, security instability, and humanitarian crises undermine the implementation of DRR measures to reduce climate migration. The opportunity here lies in integrating displacement risk assessments into national DRR strategies and establishing

⁹⁴ D. Mombauer, A.-C. Link, K. van der Geest, cit.

⁹⁵ *Morocco National Adaptation Plan 2022–2030*, cit.

⁹⁶ Ministry of Environment (Jordan), cit., 24–25.

⁹⁷ United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), *Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays – Financing and Investing for our Future*, 2025, 5 ff, www.undrr.org/gar/gar2025.

stronger institutional coordination between civil protection bodies and migration authorities.

Regional cooperation and cross-border governance show the most significant gaps in the MENA region. Regional organisations such as the Arab League and the GCC have addressed climate change and migration separately, without creating mechanisms to manage climate migration⁹⁸. This absence limits data sharing, coordinated early-warning systems, and joint planning for transboundary environmental risks, including drought, dust storms, and river basin stress.

The analysis of vulnerability and intersectional impacts shows that climate migration governance in MENA often fails to address the differentiated risks faced by women, children, older persons, persons with disabilities, refugees, and migrant workers. Legal frameworks have not included targeted protections for these groups and addressed social inequalities. Urban migrants in informal settlements face additional risks due to inadequate infrastructure, insecure tenure, and exposure to extreme heat or flooding⁹⁹. The opportunity in this area lies in integrating vulnerability assessments into national climate and migration policies, developing gender-sensitive adaptation and DRR strategies, and increasing access to social protection systems for climate-affected populations.

The MENA governments should formally integrate climate migration into national adaptation plans, NDCs, and climate strategies, including by identifying institutional responsibilities and establishing mechanisms for relocation and planned resettlement when necessary. DRR frameworks also should incorporate displacement risk assessments and include mobility-sensitive early-warning systems, enabling authorities to anticipate climate-related movements rather than respond only after disasters occur. In addition, regional cooperation should be strengthened through shared data platforms, coordinated early warning mechanisms, and joint environmental risk monitoring, particularly for cross-border water scarcity, drought, and dust storms.

Moreover, legal protections for vulnerable groups affected by climate migration should be expanded, particularly for women, migrant workers, refugees, stateless persons, and residents of informal settlements who face heightened climate-related risks. Inter-ministerial coordination must be improved to ensure that environment, disaster management, labour, interior, and social protection institutions work collaboratively on climate migration planning. Finally, international support should prioritise capacity-building for climate and migration governance, to enable MENA states to develop evidence-based policies and improve long-term resilience to climate migration.

⁹⁸ League of Arab States, *Arab Strategy for Migration and Displacement*, 2016, archive.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/page_attachments/2016_im_pr.pdf.

⁹⁹ E.A. Hussainzad, Z. Gou, *Climate Risk and Vulnerability Assessment in Informal Settlements of the Global South: A Critical Review*, in 13 *Land* 1357 (2024). doi.org/10.3390/land13091357.

5. Conclusion

Climate migration in the MENA region is a structural governance challenge that requires states to move beyond fragmented sectoral policies toward more integrated, inclusive, and gender-responsive approaches.

The lack of binding international obligations requires national frameworks and institutions to review existing climate change, migration, and disaster frameworks to address mobility. The thematic analysis shows that climate risks are intensifying faster than institutional reforms, widening the gap between environmental pressures and the capacity of legal and political systems to respond effectively. Addressing this gap will require political commitment, improved coordination, and greater recognition that climate migration is a long-term governance issue directly linked to development and environmental justice.

Looking forward, regional resilience will depend on MENA states' ability to deploy flexible governance tools, expand cooperation, and develop protection responses, while accounting for the differentiated impacts of climate change on vulnerable groups. International support, particularly in technical expertise, data systems, and institutional capacity-building, can strengthen national efforts. Still, progress will rely on incorporating climate migration into broader strategies on social protection, urban planning, and climate adaptation. This approach would enable states to manage climate migration effectively and enhance the human rights, security, and well-being of populations most affected by climate shocks.